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The Battle of Nashville (Including Franklin and the Nashville Campaign) | |
| December 15-16, 1864 |
The South's second city fell to MG William Tecumseh Sherman's army group on 2 September 1864. Atlanta's defenders and the Confederacy's largest western force, GEN John Bell Hood's Army of Tennessee, escaped encirclement and evacuated the city the day before. While Sherman contemplated the resumption of his offensive and a daring march to the sea, Hood was not idle. Both Hood and Sherman were essentially offensive-minded generals - neither would be content to let the other bring the War to him! Naturally, Hood had an ambitious offensive of his own. The Army of Tennessee (38,000 men) would operate northwest of Atlanta, threatening Sherman's communications and supply lines to Chattanooga and Nashville. In the process Hood hoped to lure the Army of the Tennessee from Atlanta and the South's heartland. Hood further reasoned that he might then defeat Sherman on ground of his choosing. Afterward he could complete the invasions of Tennessee and possibly Kentucky, all the way to the Ohio River, before linking-up with Lee's eastern Army of Northern Virginia to battle Grant. In its entirety this was a grandiose plan for any Confederate army at any time during the War. But now, in the Fall of 1864, with the Confederacy precipitously close to collapse, the vastly out-numbered and ill-equipped Army of Tennessee had little chance for success. Nonetheless, with GEN P.G.T. Beauregard's reluctant okay (Richmond had made Beauregard commander of the new Military Division of the West in early October), Hood began the advance that would end in the eventual break-up of his army. Sherman pursued Hood for a short time, and elements of his command repulsed a Confederate attack on his supply base north of Marietta (5 October - Battle of Allatoona). But by mid-November, Sherman was preparing for his own ambitious march, leaving MG George H. Thomas, the "Rock of Chickamauga," in Nashville and MG John M. Schofield in Pulaski, TN to deal with the ubiquitous John Bell Hood. The Confederate leader now knew that he would be facing Thomas and Schofield and not Sherman. Union strategy dictated that Schofield's forces (30,000 men) fight delaying actions as Hood pushed north toward Nashville, where Thomas was consolidating his defenses. Amazingly Schofield was able to escape envelopment by Hood's infantry and cavalry north of the Duck River Line at Spring Hill (29 November). For somewhat inexplicable reasons, the out-manned Union force was able to pull-back (night of 29-30 November) along the uncut Columbia-Franklin Road to prepared positions anchored by the Harpeth River in Franklin, 15 miles south of Nashville. A frustrated Hood recklessly ordered a frontal assault against the entrenched Union troops at the Battle of Franklin (30 November). The attack was furious but premature. Not all of the southern infantry and artillery had made it to the front, and heavy losses were incurred. Intense combat lasted until well after dark, but the Union lines held. Around midnight Schofield's troops were crossing the Harpeth, burning the bridges behind them. On 1 December, Hood surveyed the empty Federal works thinking he had won a victory at Franklin - in fact, his army had suffered horrendous casualties (12 generals wounded or killed, including the loss of MG Patrick Cleburne - the "Stonewall of the West") and Schofield had again slipped away - this time to the relative safety of the heavily fortified defenses of Nashville. The Army of Tennessee (30,000 men) trudged on, taking up positions south of the city (2 December), as its commander waited vainly for reinforcements from the West. With the addition of Schofield's men, MG Thomas now had about 50,000 troops in Nashville. Washington prodded Thomas repeatedly to move against Hood's army, but the cautious and methodical Virginian would not budge until he could remount his cavalry arm. Inclement weather caused further delays. Then, once again, something very puzzling happened. GEN Hood divided his forces, sending two cavalry divisions and three infantry brigades (MG Nathan Bedford Forrest, commanding) to attack Murfreesboro, 30 miles to the southeast. They would not make it back in time to become a factor in the Battle of Nashville. Out of an early morning heavy fog on 15 December, Thomas' Army of the Cumberland demonstrated against Hood's right and at mid-day struck a devastating blow against the Confederate left, driving the bulk of the Army of Tennessee 2 miles to the rear as darkness fell. At this point a prudent retreat would have possibly saved the remainder of the Army of Tennessee from what appeared to be certain annihilation on the morrow. All night the Confederates entrenched their new, compact lines between Shy's Hill (west) and Overton Hill (east). There would be no withdrawal; Hood was determined to stand. The battle resumed with a Union cannonade in the morning. Federal strategy remained the same. The Confederate right was attacked first. And late in the afternoon, after the Union cavalry (BG James H. Wilson, commanding) had gained the southern rear (Forrest was not present to counter this envelopment), a massive assault routed the Confederate left (Shy's Hill). Hood's army was finished as an offensive force. The "Rock of Chickamauga" prevailed again...Nashville was the last major battle in the West. The once formidable Army of Tennessee was soon broken-up. Many of its dejected, battle-hardened veterans were sent east to engage Sherman for one last time during the Carolinas Campaign. Estimated Casualties (Franklin and Nashville): Union - 5,300+; Confederate - 12,000+.
Notes:
Numbers in parentheses reflect estimated strength of armies or units.
Estimated casualty figures are totals for killed, wounded, missing in action, and taken prisoner.
Alternative names of battles and campaigns appear in parentheses.
Military and naval rank abbreviations in text: LT - Lieutenant, CPT - Captain, MAJ - Major, LTC - Lieutenant Colonel, CDR - Commander (Navy), COL - Colonel, BG - Brigadier General, MG - Major General, RADM - Rear Admiral (Navy), LTG - Lieutenant General, VADM - Vice Admiral (Navy), and GEN - General.
Army Organization: Although authorized and actual strength and the rank of the commanding officer often varied, the standard military unit during the War was the infantry regiment (1,000 men, COL commanding) which was comprised of 10 companies (100 men each, CPT commanding). 3-4 Regiments = 1 Brigade (3,000-4000 men, BG commanding). 3 (sometimes 4) Brigades = 1 Division (9000-12,000 men, BG or MG commanding). 2-4 (usually 3) Divisions = 1 Corps (18,000-24,000+ men, MG - North and MG or LTG -South commanding). 2 or more Corps = An Army (usually 20,000-100,000+ men - MG, LTG, or GEN commanding). 2 or more Armies = An Army Group (usually 100,000+ men - MG, LTG, or GEN commanding).
Sources:
Atlas for the American Civil War, The West Point Military History Series, 1986.
Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era, by James M. McPherson. 1988.
Battlefields of the Civil War, by Roger W. Hicks and Frances E. Schultz. 1989.
The Centennial History of the Civil War, 3 Vols., by Bruce Catton. 1961-65.
The Civil War (Series), Editors of Time-Life Books. 1983.
The Civil War: A Narrative, 3 Vols., by Shelby Foote. 1958-1974.
The Civil War: An Illustrated History, by Geoffrey C. Ward with Ric Burns and Ken Burns. 1990.
The Civil War Battlefield Guide, Ed. by Frances H. Kennedy. 1990.
The Civil War Day by Day: An Almanac, by E.B. Long with Barbara Long. 1971.
The Encyclopedia of Military History, Second Rev. Ed., by R. Ernest Dupuy and Trevor N. Dupuy. 1986.
West Point Atlas of American Wars, Vol. I, Ed. by Vincent J. Esposito. 1959.
Who Was Who in the Civil War, by Stewart Sifakis. 1988.
Photographs courtesy of The Generals of the American Civil War Website.
