The Petersburg Campaign and Siege
June 15, 1864-April 2, 1865

Late in the eventful Spring of 1864, Confederate GEN Robert E. Lee told LTG Jubal Early: "We must destroy this army of Grant's before he gets to the James River. If he gets there it will become a siege, and then it will be a mere question of time." After the Union defeat at Cold Harbor, LTG Ulysses S. Grant's Army of the Potomac stood before Richmond finally out of maneuvering room and deftly blocked by Lee's Army of Northern Virginia. Grant now opted to bypass the Confederate capital and strike next at Petersburg on the south bank of the Appomattox River, 23 miles below Richmond. Under cover of darkness (12-13 June), the Union army rapidly pulled-out of Cold Harbor. And by the morning of 15 June most of Grant's infantry had crossed the James via an extraordinarily long pontoon bridge. The lead elements were poised to take Virginia's second largest city. Petersburg was a major industrial center, port and railway hub, and the main supply depot servicing Richmond. It was also ripe for the taking because Lee was not yet sure of Grant's whereabouts, and only a small defensive force (2,500+ men - GEN P.G.T. Beauregard, commanding) manned the city's extensive earthworks. Late in the day (15 June) the Federal XVIII Corps (16,000 men - MG William F. "Baldy" Smith, commanding) missed an exceptional opportunity to take the city and possibly shorten the War by several months. Smith was overly cautious and very wary of Beauregard's imposing fortifications (the Dimmock Line). Although the area was held by meager forces, Smith failed to follow-up initial successes, allowing the defenders to establish a second line. Additional piecemeal and unsuccessful Union attacks were made on 16 and 17 June as troops from both sides arrived on the Petersburg front. After Beauregard withdrew to a third, stronger line on the outskirts of the city, Grant launched an all-out attack (18 June - 70,000 infantrymen). But by then Lee and most of the Army of Northern Virginia had arrived and the assault was repulsed. The next day (19 June) Lee's great fear was realized - Grant ordered the Army of the Potomac and the Army of the James (combined strength 110,000+ men) to lay siege lines from Bermuda Hundred (southeast of Richmond) to Petersburg. The bitter struggle for Virginia's second city would last over 9 months, fulfilling Lee's prophecy in the end. The Army of Northern Virginia (59,000 men), its vaunted mobility now curtailed, was irrevocably committed to the defense of Petersburg and Richmond. Throughout the Southland there was a slight glimmer of hope that the growing peace movement in the North would gather enough strength to encourage U.S. voters to defeat incumbent President Abraham Lincoln in the upcoming Election of 1864. If Lee could hold out and if Lincoln could be denied reelection by a war-weary electorate - then public opinion just might force a negotiated peace! It was a long shot, at best. During June, the defenders turned back several Federal attempts to cut the railroads into Petersburg. And in early July, Grant was unexpectedly forced to send the VI Corps north to protect Washington, DC from a threatened raid by the Confederate II Corps (15,000 men - LTG Jubal Early, commanding) which had been operating successfully in the Shenandoah Valley since mid-June. The most dramatic and storied attempt to breach the Confederate lines occurred during the Battle of the Crater. On 25 June, the 48th Pennsylvania Volunteer Infantry (a regiment of former coal miners led by mining engineer LTC Henry Pleasants) began tunneling toward a salient on the east side of Petersburg's defenses, with intent to explode a mine at the end of the tunnel. The Army of the Potomac's corps of engineers were skeptical and took no part in the scheme, but the Pennsylvanians had the approval of MG Ambrose E. Burnside (IX Corps commander) and  MG George G. Meade (army commander). A new division of black soldiers was chosen by Burnside to make the first assault after the explosion. They were given special training, and, despite the digging of counter-shafts by the suspicious defenders, the mine was set to go off at the end of the 510 feet long tunnel on 30 July. Only hours before the detonation, Meade, with Grant's approval, ordered an unprepared white division to attempt the initial breakthrough. At 4:45 AM four tons of gunpowder blew a huge hole (25 to 30 feet deep) in the Confederate line. The mine was a shocking success, but the subsequent attack was mismanaged. The confused, poorly led assault division entered "The Crater" instead of attacking the now exposed southern trenches. Union casualties reached 4,000 while the Confederates suffered less than 1,500. Grant called the battle: "...the saddest affair I have witnessed in the War." On 18 August, the Union V Corps (MG Gouverneur K. Warren, commanding) finally severed the vital rail line (18-21 August - Battle of Weldon Railroad near Globe Tavern) running south from the city. A week later (25 August), however, the Confederate III Corps (LTG Ambrose Powell Hill, commanding) defeated the Union II Corps (MG Winfield S. Hancock, commanding) at the Battle of Ream's Station, further south on the Weldon tracks. But this victory and additional southern successes in September and October could not keep Grant from extending his entrenchments to the west. The cold months saw artillery and mortar duels but little infantry action. Then in late winter, Grant was able to stretch his left to within three miles of Burgess' Millon the Boydton Plank Road (5-7 February 1865 - Battle of Hatcher's Run), further menacing the Southside Railroad - the last line south and west from Petersburg. The arrival of the new season meant the end of the long campaign and siege was near. By now both Grant and Lee knew that Petersburg and Richmond were untenable. If the Confederacy were to survive the spring, the Army of Northern Virginia must avoid encirclement and march south to link-up with GEN Joseph E. Johnston's army in North Carolina. But Grant and Meade would have none of this. In a desperate attempt to open an escape route west of Petersburg, Lee ordered an early morning surprise attack (25 March) against the Union right at Fort Stedman, just east of the city. The fort was taken and the nearby specially built U.S. military railroad from City Point on the James to the siege fortifications was threatened. Confederate forces, however, were too weak - Lee's lines were thinly spread over a 37 mile front - and a Federal counterattack reclaimed the redoubt, driving the attackers back to their entrenchments. The repulse at Fort Stedman signaled the beginning of the final actions. Sunday, 26 March, dawned ominous for the South - MG Philip H. Sheridan's cavalry command, fresh from victories in the Shenandoah (Valley Campaign of 1864 including Battle of Waynesboro on 2 March 1865) and around Lynchburg arrived to bolster Grant's command (now about 125,000 men). Also on this day GEN Lee notified President Jefferson Davis, that in order to save the Army of Northern Virginia, he was preparing to give-up Richmond and Petersburg. By the evening of 29 March, the Union held Boydton Plank Road, and on 31 March sharp engagements were fought at White Oak Road and Dinwiddie Court House. Late on the following day (1 April) the Confederate far right (west of Petersburg) collapsed at the Battle of Five Forks. This strategic road junction had protected access to the Southside Railroad and Lee's retreat corridor. Now with the disintegration of the southern right, Grant was able to order a general offensive along the front for 2 April. During the fighting west of the city the South lost one of its greatest corps commanders, LTG A.P. Hill. By nightfall Lee began a forced withdrawal from the Richmond-Petersburg defenses. The remnants of the once mighty Army of Northern Virginia, now reduced to about 36,000 effectives, converged on the north bank of the Appomattox River. The road to Richmond and Petersburg had been long and arduous. The pursuit to Appomattox Court House would be short and swift. On 3 April, U.S. President Lincoln, visiting the front at the invitation of General-in-Chief Grant, reviewed troops of the victorious Army of the Potomac in Petersburg, and the following day he traveled on to Richmond. The longest siege of the War was over. Estimated Casualties: Union - 42,000; Confederate - 28,000.

Notes:

  1. Numbers in parentheses reflect estimated strength of armies or units.

  2. Estimated casualty figures are totals for killed, wounded, missing in action, and taken prisoner.

  3. Alternative names of battles and campaigns appear in parentheses.

  4. Military and naval rank abbreviations in text: LT - Lieutenant, CPT - Captain, MAJ - Major, LTC - Lieutenant Colonel, CDR - Commander (Navy), COL - Colonel, BG - Brigadier General, MG - Major General, RADM - Rear Admiral (Navy), LTG - Lieutenant General, VADM - Vice Admiral (Navy), and GEN - General.

  5. Army Organization: Although authorized and actual strength and the rank of the commanding officer often varied, the standard military unit during the War was the infantry regiment (1,000 men, COL commanding) which was comprised of 10 companies (100 men each, CPT commanding). 3-4 Regiments = 1 Brigade (3,000-4000 men, BG commanding). 3 (sometimes 4) Brigades = 1 Division (9000-12,000 men, BG or MG commanding). 2-4 (usually 3) Divisions = 1 Corps (18,000-24,000+ men, MG - North and MG or LTG -South commanding). 2 or more Corps = An Army (usually 20,000-100,000+ men - MG, LTG, or GEN commanding). 2 or more Armies = An Army Group (usually 100,000+ men - MG, LTG, or GEN commanding).

Sources:

Photographs courtesy of The Generals of the American Civil War Website.

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