The Battle of the Wilderness
May 5-6, 1864

With the Spring of 1864 came the final great pivotal battles in the West (Vicksburg) and in the East (Gettysburg). And now, with the advent of the last full year of fighting, the growing preponderance of northern might, fueled by a superior industrial capacity and an abundant supply of manpower, would be felt by an ever shrinking Southland, whose ability to sustain the war effort diminished daily as 1864 wore on. In early March, the Union's most successful campaigner, MG Ulysses S. Grant, was summoned East by President Lincoln to replace MG Henry W. Halleck as general-in-chief of the Union armies, with the newly revived rank of lieutenant general (LTG) - only George Washington (permanent) and Winfield Scott (brevet) had previously held the three-star rank in the U.S. Army! The scholarly Halleck was retained as Army Chief of Staff. Acting as the main liaison between Grant, who purposely made his headquarters in the field with the Army of the Potomac, and Washington's bureaucracy, the politically astute Halleck was well suited for this important administrative position. Union grand strategy for the War's final campaigns called for an unprecedented series of five coordinated advances on several fronts by the two major (Army of the Potomac and Army of the Tennessee) and three lesser (Army of the James, Army of the Gulf, and Department of West Virginia) armies. Grant meant for the Federal thrusts to be made in concert to maximize offensive pressure, which lessened the Confederate high command's opportunities, through interior lines, to shift troops at critical times. He also ordered the armies campaigning in Georgia and the Shenandoah Valley of Virginia to destroy the South's "war resources" (industrial and agricultural). Clearly in the final year, the North would pursue a stepped-up war of attrition! The battle plan for the main Union force, the huge Army of the Potomac (118,000+ men - MG George G. Meade, commanding but under LTG Grant's strategic control), was simple and direct: Meade would move continuously against the Army of Northern Virginia (62,000+ men - GEN Robert E. Lee, commanding) wherever it may be found. Ultimately, and if all went well, Lee's army would be gradually forced to fall back on the defenses of Richmond. This strategy was not unique - Lincoln had long advocated aggressive closure with the South's premier army - but the manner in which Grant implemented it would be! Disagreements within the southern high command over proposed offensive operations for the new year in the West and the close proximity of a revitalized and menacing Army of the Potomac about to stir, convinced Lee to adopt a "wait and see" defensive posture in the Spring of 1864. As the campaigning season approached, both presidents and their high commands were mindful of the potential impact another costly Union advance into, and subsequent retreat from, the Virginia interior would have on the northern electorate prior to the Federal Presidential Election of 1864. Elsewhere in the Virginia Theater two smaller Union armies were operating in support of the major effort just beginning along the Rappahannock. The Army of the James (30,000+ men - MG Benjamin F. Butler, commanding) was marching up the south bank of the James River toward Petersburg in an attempt to cut the Army of Northern Virginia's supply and communications lines. To the northwest, troops from the Department of West Virginia (6,500+ men - MG Franz Sigel, commanding) were detailed to harass the Shenandoah Valley and destroy Confederate resources. Both Union peripheral actions, however, would suffer significant setbacks by mid-May. But now, after months of preparation, the long columns of the Army of the Potomac, in the early morning darkness of 4 May, began crossing the Rapidan River, 17 miles west of Fredericksburg, plunging into the Virginia Wilderness - the first great battle of 1864 was only hours away. Grant hoped to quickly clear the Wilderness, a desolate area (12 miles wide by 6 miles deep) of dense, second growth scrub oak and pine and the scene of Lee's great tactical victory at Chancellorsville one year earlier. Once free of this forbidding region with its grim memories, Grant hoped to turn Lee's right and give battle somewhere north of the Confederate capital. Lee knew that he must strike Grant in the Wilderness where the Federal preponderance of numbers and artillery would be less telling. Once again the South's great general would have his way! On the morning of 5 May initial contact was made between the Union V Corps (MG Gouverneur K. Warren, commanding) and Confederate II Corps (LTG Richard S. Ewell, commanding) along the Orange Turnpike deep in the Wilderness - the battle had begun. Intense but confusing small unit engagements prevailed because larger maneuvers were hampered by the terrain's entangling undergrowth, the battle's thick smoke, and the incidence of flash brush-fires. By late afternoon infantry from three Federal corps (V, VI - MG John Sedgwick, commanding, and II - MG Winfield S. Hancock, commanding) and two Confederate corps (II and III - LTG A.P. Hill, commanding) were engaged as desperate but indecisive fighting spread slowly southward to the Orange Plank Road. The next day (6 May) early Union successes were turned back by the arrival of LTG James Longstreet's I Corps, which had been a day's march behind the bulk of Lee's army. Longstreet's veterans mounted a counterattack that threatened to envelop the Federal left, but at the height of the southern assault Longstreet was seriously wounded by his own troops. Lee's "war horse" and best corps commander was out of action for five months. Additional Confederate surges in the late afternoon against both Union flanks were blunted by stiff resistance along the Brock Road in the south and by darkness in the north. The stalemate in the Wilderness produced horrendous casualties on both sides, yet neither army turned back. Unlike several of his predecessors, who withdrew north of the Rappahannock after other difficult encounters with Lee's Army of Northern Virginia, a determined Grant turned the Army of the Potomac south toward Spotsylvania Court House and the next bloody confrontation on the road to Richmond. Estimated Casualties: Union - 17,500+; Confederate - 10,500+.

Notes:

  1. Numbers in parentheses reflect estimated strength of armies or units.

  2. Estimated casualty figures are totals for killed, wounded, missing in action, and taken prisoner.

  3. Alternative names of battles and campaigns appear in parentheses.

  4. Military and naval rank abbreviations in text: LT - Lieutenant, CPT - Captain, MAJ - Major, LTC - Lieutenant Colonel, CDR - Commander (Navy), COL - Colonel, BG - Brigadier General, MG - Major General, RADM - Rear Admiral (Navy), LTG - Lieutenant General, VADM - Vice Admiral (Navy), and GEN - General.

  5. Army Organization: Although authorized and actual strength and the rank of the commanding officer often varied, the standard military unit during the War was the infantry regiment (1,000 men, COL commanding) which was comprised of 10 companies (100 men each, CPT commanding). 3-4 Regiments = 1 Brigade (3,000-4000 men, BG commanding). 3 (sometimes 4) Brigades = 1 Division (9000-12,000 men, BG or MG commanding). 2-4 (usually 3) Divisions = 1 Corps (18,000-24,000+ men, MG - North and MG or LTG -South commanding). 2 or more Corps = An Army (usually 20,000-100,000+ men - MG, LTG, or GEN commanding). 2 or more Armies = An Army Group (usually 100,000+ men - MG, LTG, or GEN commanding).

Sources:

Photographs courtesy of The Generals of the American Civil War Website.

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