Balaclava to Inkerman

Following the victory at the Alma, the Allied army moved south towards Sebastopol. Sir John Burgoyne, Raglan's chief engineer, considered the fortifications confronting any advance from the north, although in an indifferent state of repair, were still sufficient to offer a serious obstacle. The French Command, St. Arnaud, now fatally ill, also advocated skirting the northern side of Sebastopol and attacking for the south. These opinions were upheld and the Allied army, with the British forces in the vanguard skirted the town. Whether an assault against the north would have succeeded in a matter for debate, many Russian observers believe it would have, it may have avoided months of bloody and wasteful siege warfare.

Map: The Allied route to Sebastopol from the Alma

Raglan deferred to the opinion to maintain the Anglo-French accord, and therefore deferred, much against his better judgment. By September 22^nd, the French still would not move, who were resting and resupplying. Raglan took the opportunity to bury the British dead and evacuate the wounded. The French repeatedly claimed that they had won the battle of the Alam single-handedly, this was considered forgivable of the dying Marshal St. Arnaud, who, although the British had suffered more casualties complained that 'they have more wounded than me', but 'the English are not ready yet'. On September 23^rd, the troops finally set out under a warm sun. The troops were able to plunder as they marched, Morale was high and cholera had abated. The army crossed the river Berbek and Sebastopol was sighted for the first time. Raglan was by now convinced that it was too late to attack from the north and maneuvered for a southern attack, where Balaclava also lay.

While the flank march passed around Sebastopol, the Russians had not been idle Prince Menshikov had forced Admiral Kornilov to scuttle the Russian fleet in Sebastopol harbor instead of confront the allied fleet in the Black Sea. The Russian commander also sent the major part of his army out towards Bakchu Serai to the north-east, from where he hoped to offer a serious threat to the land ward flank of the Allied armies. Lord Lucan and the cavalry came upon the a Russian column marching north-east and snatched some supply wagons before Raglan called them off.

By nightfall on September 25^th, the British Army was spread out from the river Chernaya to the Belbek. They rested, with Raglan aware that his army was wide open to a surprise attack in a barely reconnoitered countryside and cut off for the fleet which was still anchored at the mouth of the Katcha. The next morning, the army rose, well rested and breakfasted, and struck out for Balaclava. After pushing through some ineffective mortar fire, the British forces entered Balaclava, where local people held by trays piled high with fruit, flowers and bread as a sign of friendship. The French followed the next day, General Canrobert was now in charge, St. Arnaud having deteriorated even further, and discussed the positions to be taken by the allied armies. Raglan, wrongly advised by Rear Admiral Sir Edmund Lyons, chose to remain at Balaclava, while the French went to the better facilities of the two western bays of Kamiesh and Kazach. The decision would place an enormous strain on the British forces, for they had an inadequate base, but were also committed to defending the land flank of the allied forces from attack at the same time as laying siege to Sebastopol itself.

When Lord Raglan made the decision to hold onto Balaclava, he did not anticipate a protracted siege. Between September 27^th and October 10^th Raglan still pressed for an immediate assault on Sebastopol, but he was unable to convince Canrobert and Sir John Burgoyne of the wisdom of this course. Burgoyne instead that the fortifications be reduced by artillery fire first, and Canrobert would not risk a direct assault over open ground and with the possibility of a flank attack

By October 10^th, it was evident that the Allies had decided to submit Sebastopol to a formal siege. As every day passed, the Russian fortifications at Sebastopol improved and made frequent and successful sallies against the advancing allies. And Sebastopol was being steadily reinforced by troops from Odessa and other conveniently nearby bases. By October 9^th, 28,000 fresh troops had entered Sebastopol, bringing the garrison to 38,000 in all. By the second week in October, the Russians had fully recovered their balance after the defeat at Alma.

The allies main hope now lay with pounding the Russian defenses into rubble. After much travail the heavy guns and siege equipment were hauled onto the plateau outside Sebastopol, nearby houses were ripped apart to provide gun platforms suitable for the rocky terrain. At last, on October 17^th at 6:30 am the cannonade began. The Russians had meanwhile been able to increase the land ward arsenal of Sebastopol from 172 to 341 guns, against them there were 53 French and 73 British guns, Of the French weapons, 49 guns were sited on mount Rodolphe facing Central Bastion.

A naval bombardment had been planned to coordinate with the land bombardment, but had been postponed due to the lack of ammunition, and the British Admiral Dundas gave way to the French Admiral Hamelin when Canrobert ordered they anchor in line to deliver their broadsides from a good range, instead of maneuvering to inflict more serious damage. Little damage was done by the 1,100 guns of the fleet except on Fort Constantine, and the Russian guns wreaked havoc among the wooden warships, when the action broke off at 5:30 pm, the Royal Navy had lost 300 men killed or wounded and seven British warships had suffered serious damage.

The land bombardment went much better, even though a French magazine on Mount Rodolphe was blown sky high, preventing bombardment for the day. The British guns did considerable damage and reduced one of the six main redoubts, Redan to rubble. The French, however were not prepared to assault the defenses of Sebastopol and by the next morning the Russians had effected remarkable repairs to their fortifications. This dispiriting pattern was repeated over several days, but Russian losses were heavy over 2,000 killed in the first three days, including on October 17^th, Admiral Kornilov.

The Allied attention was dramatically diverted on October 24^th when Prince Menshikov appeared northeast of the Allies, assembling an army under General Liprandi on the Chernaya river, with the intention of cutting the vital Woronzov road connecting Balaclava to Sebastopol, and to threaten Balaclava itself.

On October 25^th, a Russian Army of 25,000 infantry, 34 squadrons of horse and 78 guns advanced towards Balaclava. The Allied forces were drawn up to face them, the French on the left flank, British on the right, with some Turkish detachments manning the redoubts on the Causeway Heights which protected Balaclava. The Russians pushed on and achieved some early success by overrunning the foremost Turkish outposts. When they reached the Fediukine Valley, the Russians found themselves facing the 93^rd Highland Regiment and the British cavalry, led by Lord Lucan. The 93^rd, inspired by their commander Sir Colin Campbell with the words 'Remember there is no retreat. You must die where you stand!' did indeed stand firm and turned aside the Russians cavalry. Thus originated the 'thin red line'. The speed and success of the Russian advance was itself responsible for the formation of the 'thin red line' as the infantry did not have time to form square at Balaclava.

The task to finally check the Russian assault fell to Lucan's cavalry. The heavy brigade of six squadrons dressed their lines immaculately despite Lucan's repeated orders to charge, and the three thousand Russian cavalry that were pouring over the Causeway heights stopped at the sight of this parade ground display. It seemed absurd that a mere eight hundred gaudily dressed British cavalry could stop the somber, businesslike Russian cavalry. When at last, General Sir James Scarlett, the Heavy brigades commander, was satisfied that his ranks were in proper order, he turned and led the charge at the enemy who stood, unbelieving. In a flurry of hooves and flashing saber blades, the Scots Greys, Inniskilling Dragoons and the Dragoon Guards crashed into the Russian center, and after five minutes of desperate fighting, the Russian ranks began to waver, their discomfort heightened by British artillery falling on their rear. After eight minutes the Russian cavalry broke and fled over the heights.

Watching this from a mere five hundred yards aware was Lord Cardigan, the commander of the Light Brigade who commented 'Damn those Heavies, they have the laugh of us this day.'

Lord Cardigan watching the triumph of the heavy Brigade over the Russians, and Lucan had forbade Cardigan from advance at this stage of the battle, or so cardigan always asserted afterwards. Lucan, on the other hand, claimed he had empowered Cardigan to take advantage of any reasonable opportunity to attack. The Light brigade made no move at any rate. Lord Raglan was convinced that Cardigans fresh squadron should be sent in to hammer home the heavies victory, and unfortunately the infantry support normally required was not forthcoming, though both the 1^st and 4^th Division were moving into the valley, the 4^th had been ordered to advance and take the redoubts the Russians had been driven from.

Raglan therefore decided to use the Light Brigade as unsupported infantry. Lord Lucan had already, an hour earlier, ignored an ordered stating 'Cavalry to advance and take advantage of any opportunity to recover the Heights. They will be supporting by the infantry, which had been ordered to advance on two fronts.' There was still no infantry in evidence, and Lucan continued to hold his men in check.

Raglans staff suddenly saw that the Russian Horse artillery men were trying to tow away the abandoned guns on the heights. A specific new order was now composed and it read: 'Lord Raglan wishes the cavalry to advance rapidly to the front - follow the enemy and try to prevent the enemy carrying away the guns. Troop Horse Artillery may accompany. French cavalry is on your left. Immediate.'

Captain Lewis Nolan was entrusted with the message due to his riding skills, however the officer openly despised both Lucan or Cardigan, and was excitable conceited and priggish. Nolan handed Lucan the order, the cavalry commander read it with mounting consternation, then announced that such an attack would be useless. The fuming Nolan replied: 'Lord Raglan's orders are that the cavalry should attack immediately.' Lucan was unsure of which guns were meant, and Nolan waved in a contemptuous gesture down the valley at the far end of the valley, he rode over and ordered Cardigan to advance. Even Cardigan knew it was virtual suicide and pointed out the danger, but Lucan insisted this was Raglans order.

Cardigan turned to his men and have the order to advance. As the Light Brigade trotted down the valley, Nolan suddenly dashed before Cardigan waving his sword and shrieking at him. Probably, Nolan had realized that the cavalry were heading at the wrong guns and was trying to avert disaster, whatever his motives, a splinter from a Russian shell tore into his chest and killed him.

The Allies troops watched on in horror from various positions as the Light Brigade was steadily obliterated. A torrent of artillery and musket fire shredded their ranks from three sides of the valley, cardigan ordered them to close in and eventually the decimated front rank reached the Russian guns and hacked at every enemy in sight. Then, seeing the Russian cavalry drawn up behind the gun, cardigan turned and trotted back, determined to lodge a complaint against Captain Nolan's insolence. The remaining lines of the Light brigade, broke through the guns, and seeing that they were hopelessly outnumbered, wheeled and retreated. of the 673 men who took part in the charge, 113 were killed, 134 wounded and nearly 500 horses were killed. It was a disaster. Both Lucan and Cardigan could have exercised more discretion and Nolan could bear no witness to the truth. See also: The Charge of the Light Brigade

Raglan was incensed at the tragedy and tried to shield Lucan from official criticism. Dardigan was quite unrepentant and rode from the field of battle to drink and sleep. He left the Crimea shortly after at his own request, Lucan was recalled. The Battle was lost, the Russians still occupied the Causeway Heights and commanded the vital Woronzov road, possession of which would have alleviated supply problems in the coming winter.

The day after the battle of Balaclava, the Russians launched a minor offensive against the British 2^nd Division on the Home Ridge, over which ran the post road from Inkerman Ridge towards the Woronzov Road. Colonel Federov with six battalion and four guns broke through outlying British positions but was turned back by artillery fire from the ridge. The Russians lost some 270 men in this battle of Little Inkerman. But the commander of the 2^nd Division, Sir George de Lacy Evans, was hurt by a fall from his horse and handed over command to Brigadier General Pennefather of the 1^st Brigade, who led the division in the subsequent battle.

That evening there was more reshuffling of senior positions when lord Raglan received a letter informing him that Sir George Cathcart would give up his 'dormant commission' to succeed to the command of the army in the event of Raglan's death. Raglan was relieved to have the matter cleared up, for he claimed that it had disturbed his normally close relationship with Sir George brown, the most senior of his divisional commanders, Cathcart expressed relief as well, but within ten days he was killed in action at Inkerman.

The Siege of Sebastopol continued in the aftermath of Balaclava, the heavy guns pounding the town's defenses, but it seemed to some observers that the more punishment they took the stronger the defenses became. The allied armies now began to experience the onset of winter. Rain and sharp edged winds lashed the Allied army, and the army began to doubt if it would storm Sebastopol at all. Lord Raglan continued, at first, to be popular enough with his troops, though he was extraordinarily reluctant to show himself or acknowledge their cheers. Soon the men were grumbling that because Lord Raglan did not come amongst them, he had no idea of their hardships or sufferings.

Raglan, however, was a deeply preoccupied men, Sebastopol had not fallen and many troops had been lost through battle and disease, the French were not being as cooperative as they could be and winter was closing in. Yet he was apparently incapable of spelling out his demands to his masters at Whitehall. The Times and other newspapers continued to print military secrets, despite the Duke of newcastle trying to prevent such prints.

Following Little Inkerman, the Russians built their forces up in the Chernaya valley for a week, Prince Menshikov had about 120.000 men at his disposal. The British had just 25,000 troops and the French 40,000.

Map: The Battle of Inkerman

Order of Battle at Inkerman November 5, 1854

Despite the ominous menace of 'Little Inkerman' no changes were made to the dispositions on the British front. The 2^nd Division was still on Home Ridge; Of the 1^st Division, the Guards brigade was near to the windmill on the post road, while the Highland brigade was at Balaclava; the camps of the 3^rd and 4^th Divisions stretched away to the west of the windmill. The remnants of the Light Brigade were in support of the Guards positions and the Heavy Brigade was encamped near lord Raglan's headquarters on the col to the left of the post road and at the eastern end of the Wellway gully.

The geography of the area was hilly and broken up. Inkerman Ridge rose sharply and massively from the south bank of the river Chernaya, this heavily wooded spur contained ridges as high as 636 feet above sea level and averaged about 400 feet. To the south-west was Careenage ravine, which divided it from the parallel Victoria Ridge, out of the Ravine ran two gullies, the Mikriakov and the Wellway. To the north-east of Inkerman River there were three similar gullies leading to the main British position on Home Ridge: the Volovia, Quarry and St. Clement ravines; of these the Quarry Ravine was the most important, for along it ran the post road from Inkerman Bridge to the south. In the middle of the south-eastern end of Inkerman Ridge was the Shell Hill, to the south of which was the British 2^nd Division.

The Russians planned to attack and defeat the British Army, while pinning down the French who were stationed on the Sapoune Heights on the right flank of the British. To achieve this, General Soimonov was to advance from Sebastopol with an army of 19,000 men along Inkerman Ridge until he established his artillery to the west of Shell Hill; General Paulov's army of 16,000 men was to descend from the Mackenzie Heights, cross the Inkerman brigade and then advance along the Quarry Ravine and take up position to the east of Shell Hill. General Gorchakov, with 22,000 men, was meanwhile to hold the French on the Sapoune Heights. As soon as Soimonov's and Paulov's forces linked up on Shell Hill, General Dannenberg was to assume command and drive south over Home Ridge and towards the windmill at the junction of the post road and the Woronzov Road. At this point, Gorchakov was to attack from the east and help crush the British army in a pincer movement.

The Russian high command also hoped to divert the French from their impending attack on the Flag staff bastion in addition to the destruction of the British army. The French attack was scheduled for the November 7^th, and by the November 3^rd the Allied commanders were aware of the impending Russian attack. Grand Dukes Nicholas and Michael had arrived in Sebastopol to watch the expected Russian triumph and the last reinforcements, two divisions of the 4^th Corps had also arrived for Odessa. The Russians began to move at 2 am on Sunday November 5^th. A persistent rain had fallen the previous night making the British outposts less alert than normal, the rumbling of the Russian gun carriages was heard, but dismissed, by the British sentries as oncoming supply wagons. In any case, who would think about launching a major attack in the middle of a downpour? At dawn, the rain eased and was replaced by dense mist, which shielded the Russian preparations from their enemies.

General Codrington, of the Light Division, had been on his horse before dawn, visiting the outpost of his brigade. As he road along Victoria Ridge, he became aware of muffled noises and movements to the front and suddenly heard a burst of firing to the left of the Light Division's position. Realizing that the army had been caught unaware he galloped back to rouse the Light Division for action. Now, the British pickets were able to make out the advancing Russian columns, Soimonov had been ordered to march along Victoria ridge but had ignored the order and approached from Sebastopol as in the original plan. If he had followed the modified orders, he may have won the day for the Russians.

The Russian advance was hampered by the mist which prevented both sides commanders from forming an accurate assessment of the situation and issuing appropriate orders. Also the fighting began to break up into a series of bitter, isolated encounters, shrouded by fog and separated from one another by trees and bush wood. men were killed by unseen enemies firing indiscriminately through the mist or stumbled into knots of their foes. Many soldiers were shot down as they marched through the mists.

The British troops suffered with damp cartridges and caps, with the rain having seeped into the barrels of many of the stacked rifles and muskets. The fighting deteriorated into hand to hand skirmishes. The Russians guns had been hauled up to Shell Hill and began firing accurately into the camp of the 2^nd Division on Home Ridge. General Bosquet hurried to the British positions with offers of assistance, which were declined and instead decided to keep his regiments ready to move towards either Inkerman or Balaclava as necessary.

The battle had developed into a series of spontaneous encounters. The main contribution of any commander was from Brigadier General Pennefather who constantly reinforced his, the 2^nd's, Divisions outposts which contributed a great deal to the break-up of the solid Russian advance into a number of scattered encounters. Nevertheless, the Russians continued to make progress. Their artillery relentless pounding the British positions from Shell Hill and both Soimonov and Paulov's columns edging closer and closer to each other. The Russians were pushing the Allies back by sheer weight of numbers.

The British soldiers fought heroically to hold their positions, the men of the Light division fired their minies with devastating accuracy into the Tomsk, Koliwan and Katerinburg regiments. The men of the 77^th Regiment of Foot pushed back a mass of Russians, fighting them into retreat. 183 men of the 49^th, led by Colonel Bellairs, repulse a whole battalion of the enemy. Everywhere, the British threw themselves at the enemy, but the numerical superiority of the Russians began to tell. Many of the British positions were running short of ammunition an as some of the shattered regiments of Soimonov's force retreated ten thousand fresh troops poured over Shell Hill intent on breaking the British line.

The 2^nd Division fought desperately around the Kitspur and Sandbag battery, north-east of Home Ridge. the Russians were repeatedly driven back by rifle butts and bayonets, until at last the grey-coated enemy drove the 2^nd Division off the Kitspur. Now, the Guards brigade arrived on the Kitspur, and threw themselves into the melee. Sir George Cathcart had sent one of his brigades along the slope to the right of the guards, but the Russians needed countering on the left and Cathcarst men were soon under fire. Cathcart himself fell to a musket ball almost immediately. The Russians were now gaining the upper hand on the Kitspur, the guards beginning to retreat, and the Duke of Cambridge had his horse shot from under him. The Situation was saved by the appearance of a regiment of French infantry who dashed the Russians back once more.

It was now about 9 am and the rain eased off, the mist began to break up. It was now evident that the main Russian attack was now developing on the Home Ridge where General Dannenberg led 6,000 troops in echelon formation. Against this menace the allies could muster only 3,000 men. A Russian victory now seemed likely, Dannenberg had a large reserve and General Gorchakov was near the Sapoune Heights with his 22,000 men.

The Russian guns now began shelling lord Raglans staff, and an ADC begged him to move further off. General Strangways lost his leg to a round shot and Colonel Somersets horse was blown apart by a shell, which didn't injure the rider. The battle now reached its height. The 2^nd and 4^th Divisions, with the guards, were beginning to tire, and the British had no reinforcements to send in. General Pennefather rode among his men, roaring them onto greater efforts, but the British losses had been heavy. Moreover, more Russian columns could be seen marching along the Quarry ravine towards the road block known as The Barrier.

At last, between 10 and 11 am, Lord Raglan decided to call on the French for immediate support. Bosquet was relieved and the French came in at a run, three battalions of Zouaves and Algerians. The tide of the battle slowly now turned against the Russians. At the Kitspur, Coldstreams, Algerians and Zouaves charged the enemy and drove them down the hill, bayoneting a good many of them in the process.

While the Russians were being thus assailed by bounding French panthers and stoical British bulldogs, two 18 pounder guns had been dragged onto Home Ridge and began pounding the Russian batteries on Shell Hill, within minutes the Russian batteries were smashed to pieces. As the Russian guns faltered, then French artillery got into action and soon twelve of the French guns were completing the rout of the Russian batteries aided by an heroic infantry assault by an assorted force from the Light and 4^th Divisions.

Between midday and 1 o'clock, General Dannenberg, without consulting his superior, Prince Menshikov, decided to give up the battle and leave Inkerman Ridge to the allies. The Russians had suffered appalling losses, and the sides were now on a rough numerical parity. Covered by the Vladimir Regiment, the Russians managed to effect an orderly withdrawal. Canrobert refused to pursue once he learned of the depleted state of the British battalion, though he warmly applauded General Pennefather's conviction that, if reinforced, he 'could lick them to the very Devil!'

As it happened, the Russians had been beaten enough. Of their attacking force of some 40,000, they had lost 10,729 men, killed wounded or prisoners (including six generals and 256 officers). the British lost 597 killed and 1,860 wounded, out of which 39 officers were killed and 750 wounded. The French lost 130 killed and 750 wounded, with 13 officer killed and 91 wounded. Three days after the battle, burial parties were still busy at work. Judging from the expressions of terror and horror on some of the British dead's faces, many of them had probably been bayoneted to death by the Russians. A formal complaint was delivered to Prince Menshikov who replied that they were religious acts carried out after learning French troops had pillaged a Russian church near Quarantine Bay.

Once again, after field surgery, the wounded were shipped off to Scutari, many perishing en route or in the hospital wards. In the aftermath, Raglan was promoted to Field Marshal and Bosquet to the Legion of Honor. Sebastopol, however, still stood and the allies postponed any idea of a direct assault. The battle had also revealed the frightening inadequacies of field communications.