Lee's Artillery Prepares for Picket's Charge
George Stewart, writing his classic Pickett's Charge: A Microhistory of the Final Attack at Gettysburg, July 3, 1863, understood that as the author of the first narrative of the charge, his job was to compile the basic facts and construct a story that would make the event comprehensible. But he also warned his readers that the charge was more complex than most people knew, even more so than he could indicate in his book:
There is...in the generally accepted story of the charge something of the massive simplicity that arises with time, as blurred actuality sharpens into folk-tale and legend. In studying the documents, however, one is continually struck by the complexities and complications of the action. It was seldom simple. Moreover, its key-note was confusion - of smoke, fear, excitement, and broken ranks. Through all these the historian must try to pierce, toward truth, though at the same time he must remember that the confusion is itself a part of the truth.1
One of the "complexities and complications" that Stewart might have had in mind concerns the role of the Confederate artillery in Pickett's Charge. Between dawn and the moment the infantry stepped off, the high command of the army discussed virtually every aspect of the charge. They came to certain conclusions and issued orders directing the army to engage in maneuvers that would lead to successful results. The plan that emerged was the most complicated one for the deployment and use of artillery ever developed by the Army of Northern Virginia.
Chief of Artillery Brigadier General William Nelson Pendleton described the primary objective of the artillery: to launch "a concentrated and destructive fire" that would "sweep the enemy from his stronghold..."2 Lieutenant Colonel Edward Porter Alexander emphasized that his objective was to put the enemy guns out of action. "My orders were as follows," he stated. "First, to give the enemy the most effective cannonade possible. It was not meant simply to make a noise, but to try & cripple him - to tear him limbless, as it were, if possible."3
The cannonade failed. The reasons behind that failure are complex and complicated, as Stewart suggested. In order to understand the extent and nature of the failure, we must first comprehend what the planners wanted the artillery to achieve and the means by which they thought they could gain their objective. This article examines the planning; the true extent of the failure and the conditions and actions that explain it will be the subject of a later article (scheduled for two issues hence).
CAPABILITY
Hindsight inflicts a form of historical blindness upon us. Pickett's Charge failed: the artillery bombardment failed miserably. It produced lots of smoke and noise, but apparently had little impact. What most remember is that Confederate artillery fired high and most of their projectiles landed on the east face of the Ridge. If we look at what happened on the east slope of Cemetery Ridge, we can get a glimpse of what Confederate artillery was capable of, and what the planners expected to accomplish. Simply put, the Confederate fire swept everything from the area. Brigadier General Henry Hunt, Chief of Artillery, Army of the Potomac, described it well:
The air was filled with projectiles there being scarcely an instant but that several were seen bursting at once. No irregularity of ground offered protection, and the plain in rear of the line of battle was soon swept of everything movable. Army headquarters, located some yards behind the crest, had to be evacuated.4
Samuel Wilkeson, a reporter for the New York Times watched near the Leister house:
A shell screamed over the house, instantly followed by another and another, and in a moment the air was full of the most complete artillery prelude to an infantry battle that was ever exhibited. Every size and form of shell known to British and to American gunnery shrieked, whirled, moaned, whistled, and wrathfully fluttered over our ground. As many as six a second, constantly two in a second, bursting and screaming over and around the headquarters, made a very hell of fire that amazed the oldest officers. They burst in the yard, burst next to the fence on both sides, garnished as usual with the hitched horses of aids and orderlies...During the fire horses...were receiving their death, and soldiers in Federal blue were torn to pieces in the road and died with the peculiar yells that blend the extorted cry of pain with horror and despair. Not an orderly, not an ambulance, not a stragger [sic] was to be seen upon the plain swept by this tempest of orchestral death thirty minutes after it commenced. One hundred and twenty pieces of artillery trying to out from the field every battery we had in position to resist their proposed infantry attack, and to sweep away the light defenses behind which our infantry was waiting?5
Lieutenant Colonel Morgan, Inspector General of the 2nd
Corps, also described the scene. He believed it would
have decimated the infantry had the fire been accurate:
...shells commenced falling about us and in our middle as though every gun was trained on us. The ambulance horses took fright and circled wildly about, a shell killed the driver, a faithful old soldier of Gibbon's battery, and horses and ambulance were all overturned in a heap. The officers sprang to secure their horses, which all appeared seized with unusual terror, and in less time than it has taken to tell it, the road was cleared of every living thing. What took place in this little group was seen repeated at every point of the field in rear of the line. A mighty hurricane could not sooner have swept it clean and bare...Had their practice been good it is possible that they might have stampeded the men and forced them from the ground.6
In order to understand Pickett's Charge, one must comprehend the damage Confederate artillery was expected to cause, and that those expectations were reasonable. There were good grounds for Confederate confidence in the guns. Robert E. Lee marched into Pennsylvania in high spirits, supremely confident of his army. In May, 1863, he had explained to John Bell Hood that "I agree with you that our army would be invincible if it could be properly organized and officered. There never were such men in an army before. They will go anywhere or do anything if properly led."7 His confidence was not limited to his infantry. In fact, his gunners had, throughout the year that Lee had been in command, consistently outperformed their opponents. At places like Antietam, Fredericksburg, and Chancellorsville they had proven significantly capable and effective, soundly trouncing their better equipped and more numerous foes.8
ARTILLERY CRITICAL
In his description of the planning of the charge, General Robert E. Lee made it quite clear that the concept of the maneuver began with the artillery position captured on July 2nd:
A careful examination was made of the ground secured by Longstreet, and his batteries placed in positions, which, it was believed, would enable them to silence those of the enemy. Hill's artillery and part of Ewell's was ordered to open simultaneously, and the assaulting column to advance under cover of the combined fire of the three.9
In the same report Lee described the failure of the infantry as a result of the failure of the artillery:
The troops moved steadily on, under a heavy fire of musketry and artillery, the main attack being directed against the enemy's left centre. His batteries reopened as soon as they appeared. Our [artillery] having nearly exhausted their ammunition in the protracted cannonade that preceded the infantry, were unable to reply, or render the necessary support to the attacking party. Owing to this fact, which was unknown to me when the assault took place, the enemy was enabled to throw a strong force of infantry against our left, already wavering under a concentrated fire of artillery from the ridge in front, and from Cemetery Hill on the left.10 (emphasis added)
Longstreet, in a note to Alexander about noon concerning the beginning of the charge, emphasized the key role of the artillery. The corps commander told his startled artillerist:
Colonel: If the artillery fire does not have the effect to drive off the enemy, or greatly demoralize him, so as to make our effort pretty certain, I would prefer that you should not advise Pickett to make the charge. I shall rely a great deal on your good judgment to determine the matter & shall expect you to let Gen. Pickett know when the moment offers.11 (emphasis added)
After Alexander replied, Longstreet wrote another note, again indicating the importance of the artillery. The "if" in the following paragraph directed the recipient to understand that the second sentence is conditional upon the first. It underscored Longstreet's recognition that the success of the infantry depended upon the success of the artillery:
Hd. Qrs., July 3rd, 1863.
Colonel:
The intention is to advance the infantry if the artillery has the desired effect of driving the enemy off, or having other effect such as to warrant us in making an attack. When the moment arrives advise Gen. Pickett, and of course advance such artillery as you can use in aiding the attack.12 (emphasis added)
After the war he repeatedly said the same thing. "The plan of assault was as follows: Our artillery was to be massed in a wood from which Pickett was to charge, and it was to pour a continuous fire upon the cemetery." He added in the same essay, "Under cover of this fire, and supported by it, Pickett was to charge...I still desired to save my men and felt that if the artillery did not produce the desired effect I would be justified in holding Pickett off."13 (emphasis added)
With Federal artillery still firing away, the conclusion that the artillery had not, and could not, prevent the enemy from decimating the attack became inescapable. Longstreet looked at Cemetery Ridge through his field glasses and then indicated that he believed that if the artillery did not accomplish its objective, the charge was doomed:
I don't want to make this attack - I believe it will fail - I do not see how it can succeed - I would not make it even now, but that Gen. Lee has ordered & expects it.14
PLANNING
Pickett's Charge "was not ordered without mature consideration," recalled Colonel Armistead Long, one of the planners of the charge.15 Indeed, the planning for the Confederate artillery was thorough, detailed, exhaustive and precise. An examination of the planning process itself offers important background.16 On July 3, 1863, the artillery of the Army of Northern Virginia had an opportunity unlike any they had ever had before, and would ever have again. The decisive moment of the Pennsylvania campaign had arrived. After two days of bloody but indecisive struggle, it was time for the final assault. For one of the few times in its history the artillery branch of the Army of Northern Virginia seemed to be almost on an equal footing with their enemy in strength and ability. About 150 guns were lined up in an arrangement that gave them a significant advantage: they were on three sides of the enemy. They had all morning to prepare their bombardment: to examine their ammunition, place their guns, and sight them in. Their ammunition was limited, but they believed they had sufficient amounts to achieve their objective.
Planning the artillery's role on July 3rd began on the evening of July 2nd. Alexander detailed his conversation with Longstreet:
During the evening I found my way to Gen. Longstreet's bivouac, a little ways in the rear, to ask the news from other quarters & orders for the morning. From elsewhere the news was indefinite, but I was told that we would renew the attack early in the morning. That Pickett's division would arrive and would assault the enemy's line. My impression is the exact point for it was not designated, but I was told it would be to our left of the Peach Orchard. And I was told too to select a place for the Washington Artillery which would come to me at dawn.17
Lee himself indicated he issued orders on the evening of the 2nd.18 Though Pendelton did not state that he received orders on the evening of July 2nd, the phrasing of his report indicated that he probably did. "By direction of the commanding general," he said, "the artillery along our entire line was to be prepared for opening, as early as possible on the morning of the 3rd."19 Both Pendleton and Alexander described the former's assessment of the latter's positions as taking place very early in the morning. Pendleton remarked that "Visiting the lines at a very early hour toward securing readiness for this great attempt, I found much (by Colonel Alexander's energy) already accomplished on the right."20
Major Benjamin Eshleman, commanding the Washington Artillery, stated that Alexander had placed his guns by midnight.21 Alexander recalled that he slept from 1:00 a.m. until 3:00 a.m., and then began overseeing the placement of the guns.22 All agree that he had the available guns in place by dawn.23
Lee began his ride to Longstreet's headquarters before dawn. After traveling about four miles along the west slope of Seminary Ridge, he arrived at about 4:45 a.m., just as the sun began to rise beyond Cemetery Ridge. During the next few hours, Lee and Longstreet rode up and down Seminary Ridge at least twice. They traveled from a spot near the Peach Orchard to a section of woods jutting out east from Seminary Ridge directly west of the Angle, and now forever known as the "point of woods." In addition, each made at least one trip without the other.
Alexander noted that Lee stopped at his position after Pendleton's early morning visit, and indicated that the assault would center on Cemetery Hill and that this necessitated a change in deployment.24 This conversation occurred at 8:00 a.m., possibly earlier, according to Alexander.25 This tells us that the plans for the artillery were still evolving about three hours after Lee and Longstreet first met.
Later in the morning Lee and Longstreet together rode to Alexander's position to discuss the plans with him. While the precise time cannot be determined, it appears in Alexander's text at a point indicating that it occurred midmorning, probably between 9 and 10 a.m., though it could have been as late as 11:00.26 Lee and Longstreet were together when the Bliss barn began to burn, at about 11:00 a.m.27
The last meeting concerning Pickett's Charge was apparently the one between Longstreet and Alexander, that took place, according to Alexander, at about 1:45 p.m.
Thus the planning of the artillery began on the evening of July 2nd. On July 3rd it carried on for at least six hours, and perhaps as long as nine or ten. Rather than one meeting at Longstreet's headquarters and a short ride to Seminary Ridge, it was a floating, on-going series of discussions. From time to time others joined and/or left the group. Among those who were present with Lee and/or Longstreet were Lieutenant General A. P. Hill, commander of the 3rd Corps; Major Generals George Pickett, Isaac Trimble and Henry Heth, division commanders in the 1st and 3rd Corps; Brigadier Generals J. J. Pettigrew and James Lane, temporarily division commanders in the 3rd Corps, and William Nelson Pendleton, Chief of Artillery, Army of Northern Virginia; the chiefs of artillery of Longstreet's and A. P. Hill's Corps, Colonel John Walton and Colonel R. Lindsey Walker; Colonel Armistead Long, Lee's Military Secretary and unofficial artillery advisor; and Lieutenant Colonel Edward Porter Alexander. Others may also have been present.28
The placement of the guns was accorded such importance that at one point Lee personally examined the ground with Longstreet. They walked forward to the edge of an apple orchard very close to the Emmitsburg Road where they were observed by two of the most forward positioned skirmishers from Colonel Benjamin Humphreys' (Barksdale's) brigade. The privates were astonished to see their commanders "on foot, no aids [sic], orderlies or couriers, fifteen or twenty steps apart, field glasses in hand." They walked past the skirmishers, stopping now and then to observe the enemy line. One of the privates warned "General Lee, you are running a very great risk." The two generals came close enough for one of the privates to hear their conversation and reported that Lee told Longstreet to "mass your artillery behind that hill," pointing to a spot just behind them, "and at the signal bring your guns to the top of the ridge and turn them loose."29
Captain William Miller Owen, acting as adjutant for Colonel John Walton, was summoned to the mid-morning planning sessions. His brief description of the plans for the charge as he found them being discussed acknowledged the crucial assignment of the guns. "A plan of attack was being discussed, which was finally concluded as follows," he wrote. "At a given signal - which was to be the firing of two guns by the Washington Artillery at the Peach Orchard - all the Confederate guns in position were to open upon the enemy's position, to prepare the way, by battering them, for our infantry to advance to the attack."30
PROBLEMS
Throughout the morning and afternoon, the planners analyzed several problems. Conclusions were drawn, and orders issued. They probably began their discussions with the difficulty of hitting the targets at long range. They could not know the exact distances, but probably had a good rough estimate. The Angle was about 1.15 miles (2,000 yards) from the Peach Orchard, 1.26 (2,200 yards) from the present North Carolina monument, 1.58 (2,900) from the McMillan house, and 2.31 (4,000) from the present intersection of Confederate Avenue and Middle Street. At that range, their Howitzers and 12 pdr. Napoleons, with an effective range of 1,800 yards, could barely reach the target from the Peach Orchard and would not be very accurate.31 The rise of ground just west of the Emmitsburg Road upon which Alexander built his line was an extension of the Peach Orchard, only 600 to 700 yards from the Angle. From the "point of woods" it was .84 miles (1,500 yards), from the Spangler Woods near the Spangler house, just .59 (1,000), and from the knoll where Alexander watched, .78 (1,300).32
The combination of the distances involved and the organization of the Confederate artillery posed a problem for the planners. Each battery included at least two different calibers of guns, sometimes three. They were divided into two classifications, smoothbores and rifles. The smoothbores included six- and 12-pdr. Howitzers and 12-pdr. bronze Napoleons. These were well-suited for defense against infantry attacks, but not reliable at a range of a mile or more. The rifles included 10 and 20-pdr. Parrotts, the new 3-inch Ordnance Rifles and two Whitworths, the most advanced and far-ranging guns on the North American continent. The Army of the Potomac had nothing to match the Whitworth Rifles, which could fire their bolts two miles or more.33 Each type of weapon needed to be placed according to its capabilities.
Lee knew that his guns were generally inferior. In the Fall of 1862 he had acknowledged as much and set about modernizing them. He wrote to the Secretary of War:
During the past campaign I have felt, in every battle, the advantage that the enemy possessed over us in their artillery. This arose in part from their possessing more experienced artillerists and better prepared ammunition, but consisted chiefly in better guns. These advantages, I am happy to state, are gradually diminishing. Our artillerists are greatly improving, our ammunition is more carefully prepared, and the efficiency of our batteries increased by guns captured from the enemy.
He wanted the best guns for his army, including the two long-range guns invented just before the war, 10-pdr. Parrott Rifles and the new 3-inch Ordnance Rifles. Having batteries made up of these three types, (and Napoleons for short-range work) would simplify the ammunition problems, reduce the weight of the guns, and give them "longer and more accurate range of fire....The contest between our 6-pounder smoothbores and the 12-pounder Napoleons of the enemy is very unequal, and, in addition, is discouraging to our artillerists."34 While some new guns had been delivered, they were not enough for the task at hand on July 3rd.35
The location and shape of the lines gave Confederate artillery a significant advantage, a key factor that helped convince the planners that the charge could succeed. They discussed the strengths and weaknesses of their positions versus those of the Army of the Potomac. Confederate lines were several miles long, extending from east of Culp's Hill, around the north end of Gettysburg, then south down Seminary Ridge. Federal lines were much shorter and more compact. In effect, they had their enemy nearly surrounded. As Pendleton said, "his troops were massed, ours diffused." Thus "his fire was unavoidably more or less divergent, while ours were convergent."36 It was easier for the Confederates to focus on enemy positions and hit one or more of them with the concentrated fire of many batteries.37
In addition, the outer lines gave them the ability to shoot at enemy lines from nearly every angle, including from their rear and flanks.38 The guns north of town, for example, could hardly miss if they fired south. Alexander probably recalled (and surely echoed) part of the discussion in his memoirs:
There was one single advantage conferred by our exterior lines, and but one, in exchange for many disadvantages. They gave us the opportunity to select positions for our guns which could enfilade the opposing lines of the enemy. Enfilading fire is so effective that no troops can submit to it long. Illustrations of this fact were not wanting in the events of this day. What has been called the shank of the Federal fish-hook, extending south from the bend at Cemetery Hill toward Little Round Top, was subject to enfilade fire from the town and its flanks and suburbs.39
Yet (as Alexander revealed) Confederate planners knew that the Army of the Potomac artillery had advantages as well. Pendleton and others thought the Federal artillery occupied higher ground, which gave them extended range. From Seminary Ridge it looked as though some of the guns were behind breastworks, and would be more difficult to hit than the Confederate guns, which were lined up out in the open.40
The quality and quantity of ammunition also posed a problem. In describing the artillery's role in the charge, Alexander made a telling comment about the quality of their ammunition and the restrictions it placed on the planning of any maneuver. Furthermore it was common knowledge throughout the entire army:
First it must be borne in mind that our Confederate artillery could only sparingly, & in great emergency, be allowed to fire over the heads of our infantry. We were always liable to premature explosions of shell & shrapnel, & our infantry knew it by sad experience, & I have known of their threatening to fire back at our guns if we opened over their heads. Of course, solid shot could be safely so used, but that is the least effective ammunition & the infantry would not know the difference & would be demoralized & angry all the same.41
Confederate ammunition was so bad that early in the war as many as 80% of their shells armed with the timed fuses exploded prematurely, too late or not at all. Much of this ammunition was still in use at Gettysburg, where, according to Alexander, "its imperfections affected the fire...of the guns."42
Apparently the last artillery issue discussed before Lee and Longstreet ended their talks was the Federal battery on Little Round Top. Longstreet made a strong case that the guns on Little Round Top would enfilade the right of Pickett's advance and could do serious damage. Colonel Long answered by pointing out that some of the 1st Corps guns of Law's (Hood's) division could be effectively employed against them. Long apparently convinced Lee that the guns "could be suppressed by our batteries. This point being settled, the attack was ordered..."43 Part of Captain Hugh Garden's South Carolina battery and the entire Troup Artillery would concentrate their fire on the Union guns on Little Round Top.
Confederate planners concluded that their advantages outweighed their disadvantages. Given the capture of the Peach Orchard, and the high ground along the Emmitsburg Road, they could overcome all their difficulties and deliver an effective rain of iron against Cemetery Ridge.
SOLUTIONS
Specific tactics and measures were designed to ensure maximum use of their advantages and the overall success of the bombardment. It is no small irony that the essence of the theory of artillery usage that the planners attempted to implement could be found in the U.S. Army's textbook, Instruction for Field Artillery, published in 1860. It had been written before the war by a panel of three authors including none other than the Chief of Artillery of the Army of the Potomac, Brigadier General Henry Jackson Hunt.44 Hunt succinctly stated what the planners sought to do:
The effect of field artillery is generally in proportion to the concentration of its fire...It has, therefore, for its object, not to strike down a few isolated men, and here and there to dismount a gun, but, by a combined and concentrated fire, destroy an enemy's cover; break up its squares and columns; to open his ranks; to arrest his attacks, and to support those which may be directed against him.45 (emphasis in original)
Confederate officers, many of whom had been trained at the Virginia Military Institute by the school's artillery instructor, Professor Thomas J. Jackson, were very familiar with these ideas. Jackson had been one of the most effective artillerists in the war with Mexico, and had helped write Instruction for Field Artillery with Hunt, Barry and French. E. P. Alexander (in another context) commented that both sides based their plans on the same concepts. The tactics he used on July 3rd "were identical with the usual practice, both of our army and the Federals, in attacking each other in position, from the beginning of the war to the end of it."46
Sheer volume would make up for poor quality of weapons and ammunition. Virtually every gun in the Army of Northern Virginia would be employed. They would throw a shower of steel at the Federals guns and men on Cemetery Ridge from every type of gun; from long to short ranges; from all angles; and with all sorts of ammunition. "All of the batteries of the First and Third Corps, and some of those of the Second, were put into the best positions for effective fire upon the point of attack and the hill occupied by the enemy's left;" Longstreet wrote in his official report.47 He added that "General Alexander was ordered to arrange the batteries of the First and Third Corps, those of the Second were supposed to be in position..."48 Chief of Artillery Pendleton noted that "By direction of the commanding general, the artillery along our entire line was to be prepared for opening..."49 The reports of numerous other officers confirm that guns from all three corps would be involved.
In order for the concentrated fire of about 150 guns spread out over a line approximately two miles long to have its desired effect, two procedures would have to be used successfully. First, the gunners would have to fire slowly and deliberately in order to make sure their aim was correct, and also to ensure that no ammunition was wasted. Pendleton reported that the 1st and 3rd Corps gunners were instructed on how to fire so as not to waste ammunition, and Longstreet said that that the orders were passed down to every battalion and battery commander.50 In his message to Colonel Walton instructing him to open fire, Longstreet again carefully stated that he should "Order great care and precision in firing."51 Major James Dearing, commanding a battalion in front of Pickett, recalled that "when the signal guns were fired, I at once brought my battalion in battery to the front, and commenced firing slowly and deliberately."52
Firing by battery offered a means of concentrating the power of the guns, and gave the best chance of destroying the Federal guns. Projectiles from four or more guns would have the greatest possible impact on a specific target. Pendleton detailed this in his account. "Our guns in position, nearly one hundred and fifty, opened fire along the entire line from right to left," he stated; "salvos by battery being much practiced, as directed, to secure greater deliberation and power."53 Dearing said "To insure more accuracy and to guard against waste of ammunition, I fired by battery."54 Indeed the only extant record of guns not firing by battery describe two batteries being divided. Captain Hugh Garden's South Carolinians, on the far right of the Confederate line, were split, with two guns firing at Cemetery Ridge and four guns firing at Little Round Top.55 The Troup Artillery was also split, with two Parrotts firing at Cemetery Ridge and two at Little Round Top.56 Note that even these fired by section.
In short, quantity would make up for the lack of quality.
To further ensure success each battery was given a specific target to fire at during the cannonade. Alexander said, "every gunner had his target selected..."57 Most batteries were ordered to concentrate on certain enemy guns, while others were chosen to act as decoys, to draw Federal fire away from the assaulting infantry. Longstreet has already been quoted stating that all of the batteries of the First and Third Corps, and some of those of the Second, "were put into the best positions for effective fire upon the point of attack and the hill occupied by the enemy's left."58 In his order to Colonel Walton to open fire, Longstreet also noted that the guns should fire by battery and that if they could not do extensive damage, they should switch targets and try to knock out the guns on Little Round Top: "If the batteries at the Peach Orchard cannot be used against the point we intend attacking, let them open on the enemy on the rocky hill."59
In Colonel H.C. Cabell's battalion, Captain B.C. Manly's battery fired against Cemetery Ridge during the cannonade. As Pickett's men marched forward, Manly realigned his guns and engaged the battery on "the mountain."60 Dearing's battalion, placed directly west of the Copse of Trees, fired at the Angle. "My fire was directed at the batteries immediately in my front," he said, "and which occupied the heights charged by Pickett's division."61
In the 3rd Corps line just north of Longstreet's guns, Lieutenant General A. P. Hill ordered Major D. G. McIntosh to move his two Whitworth Rifles north of the town to Oak Hill. There they would take "a commanding point north of the railroad cut, to enable them to enfilade the enemy's position."62 Indeed they could fire down the entire length of the Federal line, hitting every point from Cemetery Hill to Little Round Top. The guns in the 3rd Corps Reserve Artillery, posted on Seminary Ridge north of the MacMillan house, were ordered to fire on the Federal 11th Corps positions in front to them, on Cemetery Hill.63
Three batteries from Major General Robert Rodes' division of Lieutenant General Richard Ewell's 2nd Corps, stationed along Seminary Ridge west of the Bliss farm and Long Lane, were aimed at the Angle. The "batteries had been ordered to fire, in conjunction with a large number of the guns on their right, on a salient part of the enemy's line prior to the charge of infantry," reported Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Carter.64 Captain Willis Dance ordered two batteries in his reserve battalion, the 2nd and 3rd Richmond Howitzers to fire at specific Federal guns. "Our battalion was ordered to concentrate its fire on a particular battery just to the right of my company and to pay no attention to the other guns until we had silenced that," reported a member of the 3rd. "Accordingly, our 'gunners' prepared themselves for action, carefully noticing distance, etc. When they believed that the enemy battery was silenced, they zeroed in on another specific battery."65
A good portion of the artillery from Longstreet's and Hill's corps were aimed toward the five Federal batteries around the Angle. Confederate gunners achieved considerable success. Four of the five batteries were decimated, and either withdrawn or significantly reduced in effectiveness.66
Following an order from Colonel J. Thompson Brown, commander of artillery for Ewell's Corps, Carter split his own and Dance's battalion. He put ten guns in line north of town, where they could fire down the entire length of the Federal line. Their assignment was to draw fire away from other Confederate batteries and from the infantry charge. "Ten rifled guns were posted on the high ridge on the right and left of the railroad cut, and their fire directed on the batteries planted on Cemetery Hill," he reported. Likewise the guns from Dance were assigned "to divert the fire of the enemies [sic] guns from Hill and Pickett's troops in their charge across the valley, and also to divert their fire from three batteries of the First Virginia Artillery, under Captain Dance, and temporarily in my command."67
East of Cemetery Hill, a battalion of the Artillery Reserve of Ewell's Corps, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel William Nelson, was scheduled to act as decoys and draw fire from Osborn and Wainwright's guns on Cemetery Hill. Early in the morning of the 3rd, Nelson was ordered to look for good sites on the left flank. "If any could be found from which I might attract the enemy's fire from our infantry," he noted, he was to occupy them. He was unsuccessful, but around noon he received another order, presumably from Ewell or J. Thompson Brown; he was ordered to open fire anyway and draw the enemy's fire.68 Brown confirmed that these guns were assigned specific targets "in order to divert their fire from our infantry advancing from the right."69
It is important to note that all the guns were aimed at enemy artillery. None of the Confederate artillery commanders, from Pendleton and Alexander on down the chain of command, reported that their guns were concentrated on Federal infantry during the cannonade. Only when the guns went forward, and spotted the Vermont brigade moving on Kemper's right, did they mention firing at enemy infantry. For Confederate artillery, the operation on July 3rd was primarily a duel with Federal artillery, and only secondarily an attack on enemy infantry.
It is also important to note that the Angle was not the only target. Confederate gunners concentrated on several areas and sought to distract Federal gunners from the attacking infantry. To have concentrated only on one target would have alerted the enemy to the point it was intended to attack.
DURATION
Historians have long debated how long the cannonade lasted.70 What they have not paid a great deal of attention to is the question of how long the bombardment was intended to last. Alexander calculated that the supply of ammunition was too low to allow a long-term bombardment. After all, they had expended much of their stock on July 1st and 2nd, and did not have the advantage of Henry Hunt's "ghost train" of extra supplies that he began assembling in 1862.71
The planners paid attention to the question of exactly how much ammunition was available. "Colonel Walton," Longstreet recalled, "was ordered to see that the batteries of the First [Corps] were supplied with ammunition..." Pendleton noted that the batteries were "prepared" to open early in the morning, and one can assume that a battery could not be prepared without having enough supplies. This fits with the battery commanders being "cautioned how to fire so as to waste as little ammunition as possible." In addition Pendleton noted that "care was given to the convenient posting of ordnance trains, especially for the right, as most distant from the main depot, and due notice given of their position."72
Alexander detailed his calculations on how much ammunition would be expended:
Now a gun in action will easily fire from 30 carefully aimed shots in an hour, to 100 hurriedly aimed. During the previous afternoon, we had had 62 guns in action from from 1 to 4 hours, & had refilled our chests from the trains. Our reserve wagons, I knew, must be now very nearly empty of all but canister. And then, though no one cautioned me about it, my own good sense made me appreciate that it would be very imprudent not to keep to the last extremity enough ammunition to cover a retreat back to Virginia, for we were 150 miles from Staunton, the nearest point at which we could get a fresh supply. From these elements it is very easy to work out, even without exact figures, the conclusion that we had no artillery ammunition to waste.73
Alexander knew that the army had carried into Pennsylvania, including the reserve trains, about 200 rounds of ammunition per gun. This included canister, which could not be used at long range, and solid shot, which could be used but with little effect. In addition, he felt that he needed to have some left to cover the return to Virginia. On the previous day his guns had fired for one to four hours. He did not estimate the exact number of rounds on hand, but did decide that the lack of ammunition must influence how long the cannonade must last. "Now, I could not hope to bombard effectively with anything less than the whole force of artillery at my disposal, for my range was to be generally over 1,200 yards," he wrote, and he "had not the ammunition to make it a long business. It must be done inside of an hour if ever."74
Since all guns were ordered to fire slowly and deliberately, we can assume that they planned to fire at the rate of 30 shots per hour. In 20 minutes, they would fire 10 shots. There was plenty of ammunition available for this.75
Alexander first estimated that the bombardment should last about 20 to 30 minutes:
I had, at first, taken no special thought as to how long I would let the fire continue, before telling Pickett to go. Some 20 to 30 minutes I supposed to be about right. Not shorter than 20, for the longer the time the more punishment the enemy would have. But not longer than 30, because they had a long charge, & I must allow plenty of time for them to cover the distance within the hour.76
After the exchange of notes with Longstreet and further consideration, he lowered his estimate to 15 to 20 minutes.:
And then, feeling more responsibility, I began to revise my calculations about when to give Pickett the order to start. To be too soon, seemed safer than to be too late, so I fixed in my own mind on 20 minutes - with a possibility of even shortening it to 15, if things looked favorably at the time.77
When Alexander thought he saw the guns in the main part of the Federal line pullout, he finally ordered Pickett forward. It was between 1:45 and 2:00 p.m., according to his watch.78 Originally intended to last about 20 minutes and possibly as long as 30, it ended up lasting at least 45 minutes to an hour according to Alexander, and perhaps up to an hour longer, depending upon which account one concludes is the most accurate.
THE CHARGE
One of the most important parts of the plans for the Confederate artillery on July 3rd has been generally overlooked and/or misunderstood by Gettysburg historians. General Robert E. Lee clearly stated that a crucial assignment of the artillery was to go forward with the infantry and take an offensive role in the charge. Virtually every one of the important participants in the planning of Pickett's Charge who left an account noted it as part of the plan, and all stressed its importance. As Lee put it: "The batteries were directed to be pushed forward as the infantry progressed, protect their flanks, and support their attacks closely."79 (emphasis added) Longstreet recalled that he "gave orders for the batteries to refill their ammunition chests, and to be prepared to follow up the advance of the infantry."80
Like the orders to fire slowly and deliberately, and by battery at specified targets, the plan to advance the guns was a product of careful consideration. Confederate artillery had been used in this manner throughout the war. Indeed, Thomas J. Jackson had made his reputation using his guns for up-close work as far back as the war with Mexico. Henry Hunt had admired the Confederate artillery's mobility throughout the first two years of the war and on July 2nd Alexander had led his guns in a very similar maneuver.81 Perhaps the most effective artillery charge of the entire war had occurred just the day before, when Alexander led his guns against the Peach Orchard.
Using conditional language, the planners directed that any guns that were able would participate in Pickett's Charge. This meant that if a gun had enough ammunition and was mobile - had enough men and horses to man it and no broken wheels, axles, etc. - it would become part of Pickett's Charge. Longstreet's order to Alexander carried instructions that "When the moment arrives advise General Pickett, and of course advance such artillery as you can use in aiding the attack."82 In his memoirs, Alexander recalled Longstreet's orders to send the guns forward:
Note Gen. Longstreet's expression in a message to be quoted in full presently, "drive off the enemy or greatly demoralize him," When the artillery had accomplished that, the infantry column of attack was to charge. And then, further, I was to "advance such artillery as you can use in aiding the attack."83 (emphasis added)
Recall that Pendleton wrote in a matter of fact manner, as if it was of course an obvious part of the plan, that "a concentrated and destructive fire, consequent upon which a general advance was to be made."84 (emphasis added) That "general advance" included as many guns as possible.
One of the most famous stories of the charge on the Confederate side centers on nine 12-pdr. Howitzers sent to Alexander by Pendleton. Alexander clearly stated that he had earmarked them for the charge. "I placed them under cover close in rear of the forming column with orders to remain until sent for," he wrote, "intending to take them with the column when it advanced."85 In 1877, Alexander recalled that he had planned on having them "be ready to move ahead of Pickett's division in the advance."86 In the 1890s when Alexander set down the specific components of his orders that day, he again put the forward charge of the artillery as the centerpiece of his narrative, though now he said that the guns were to follow the infantry:
I intended not to let them fire a shot in the preliminary cannonade, & to keep them undercover & out of view, so that with fresh men, & uninjured horses, & full chests of ammunition, these 9 light howitzers might follow Pickett's infantry in the charge, more promptly, & also, perhaps more safely than guns out of the firing line could do. I say more safely, because one function of a firing line of artillery, in a case like this, is to cover the retreat of the storming column in case it fails to make a lodgement upon the enemy's line. If the guns from the firing line advance prematurely, & are caught in a repulse, they may not only be lost, but turned on their former owners at most critical moments, & with fatal effect.87
He also explained his concept of when the guns were supposed to go in relation to the infantry:
When I got the 9 extra howitzers, I, at first, intended merely to follow behind Pickett's infantry, without attempting to fire a shot, until I got as close as I could go without getting within infantry range. There, I would have halted & unlimbered, to cover his retreat if he were repulsed; or to limber up & follow quickly if he made a lodgement. Meanwhile, too, all the batteries in the firing line had similar orders - to limber up & follow any success, as promptly as possible.88
Alexander left several accounts in which he discussed preparations for sending guns forward with the artillery. Just two weeks after the battle he wrote his father that he was ordered to give Pickett and Pettigrew the signal to go forward. Then "my 9 reserve guns & all that could of the 75 in line were to advance also."89 (emphasis added)
THE ORDERS
During and after the wide-ranging discussion the planners carefully crafted and precisely worded a series of orders. They were deliberately and methodically repeated down the chain of command, from Lee to Longstreet and Pendleton, then to the battalion and battery commanders. Indeed virtually every officer involved remarked on their specific and detailed nature and the care that was devoted to getting them correctly disseminated. Longstreet noted that an unusual amount of effort was expended to explain all aspects of the charge to all participants:
...we had been more particular in giving orders than ever before; that the commanders had been sent for and the point of attack had been carefully designated, and that the commanders had been directed to communicate to their subordinates, and through them to every soldier in the command, the work that was before them, so that they should nerve themselves for the attack and fully understand it.90
Chief of Artillery William Nelson Pendleton recalled that great care was taken to make sure everyone had clear orders. Apparently he issued orders governing the artillery of the other two corps:
To Colonel Alexander, placed here in charge by General Longstreet, the wishes of the commanding general were repeated. The battalion and battery commanders were also cautioned how to fire so as to waste as little ammunition as possible. To the Third Corps artillery attention was also given. Major Poague's battalion had been advanced to the line of the right wing, and was not far from its left. His guns also were well posted. Proper directions were also given to him and his officers. The other battalions of this corps, a portion of Garnett's, under Major [Charles] Richardson, being in reserve, held their positions of the day before, as did those of the Second Corps, each group having specific instructions from its chief.91
If any doubt existed that the orders were clear and precise, Alexander cleared it up.
...among the very unjust &, indeed, absurd criticisms which poor Gen. Longstreet's detractors have brought against him, in connection with this battle, is one to the effect that Gen. Lee's orders were disobeyed & neglected the handling of our artillery in Pickett's Charge. Now the orders which I received, both from Longstreet & Pendleton, were quite specific, & were carried out to the letter, as I will show, & even more effectively, I think, than could have been reasonably expected beforehand. Moreover, they were identical with the usual practice, both of our army and the Federals, in attacking each other in position, from the beginning of the war to the end of it.92
CONCLUSIONS
The artillery plan for Pickett's Charge was the most complex ever designed by General Lee. Even after it failed he continued to believe that it was the best plan he could have devised. In a letter to Jefferson Davis written on July 31st, Lee said that "with the knowledge I then had, & in the circumstances I was then placed, I do not know what better course I could have pursued."93
In an effort to understand what occurred on July 3, 1863, this article has linked together several important points. The planners perceived the artillery as a key part of the charge: indeed, in their minds the success of the infantry depended upon the success of the artillery. They had their enemy virtually surrounded, and could hit him from any angle, including the rear and flanks. The destruction of Federal guns seemed a reasonable expectation, based on past performances, and the rain of steel actually delivered to the east slope of Cemetery Ridge bore this out.
The planning was not limited to Lee and Longstreet. It began on the evening of July 2nd and continued on the morning of the 3rd in a series of floating meetings that consumed at least six hours and, if one counts Longstreet's efforts and communications with Alexander, nine or ten hours. They thoroughly discussed the charge and all aspects of the artillery's participation. The charge was ordered because they believed that the ground captured on July 2nd gave them a platform for their artillery that would allow their guns to prevent Federal artillery from destroying the attack as it approached Cemetery Ridge. The sheer quantity of guns would overcome the problems posed by the shortage of ammunition and its poor quality. The guns were carefully placed and ordered to open simultaneously, and to fire slowly and deliberately by battery at specific targets, with secondary targets designated. Alexander intended the firing to last about twenty minutes, but because of the effectiveness of the Federal guns, he was forced to extend it to more than double the time planned. When the infantry began their charge, the guns were supposed to go forward.
Despite careful planning the artillery failed to achieve its objective. The generally accepted explanation, that they fired high, as George Stewart might say, is a massive simplicity that has arisen over time. The complex reality of the plan has been blurred into folk-tale and legend. Amidst the smoke, fear and excitement, a variety of factors led to failure, in turn causing the failure of the infantry assault. What those events were will be the subject of a follow-up article.
RICHARD ROLLINS is the author of "The Damned Red Flags of the Rebellion": The Confederate Battle Flag at Gettysburg, and editor of Pickett's Charge: Eyewitness Accounts.
THANKS ARE EXTENDED to Harold Bernstein, Richard Bowles, George Otott, and Jim Stanbery, for commenting on early drafts of this article.
NOTES:
George Stewart, Pickett's Charge: A Microhistory of the Final Attack at Gettysburg, July 3,1863 (Boston: 1959), x. I thank Bruce Trinque for reminding me of this quote.
Report of Brigadier General William N. Pendleton, September 12, 1863, U.S. War Department (1880-1901) "The War of the Rebellion"; Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies Series I. Vol. 27. Parts 1-3 (Washington D.C.: 1889.), p. 351. Hereafter cited as OR. All Federal reports are in Part 1 and all Confederate reports are in Part 2, unless otherwise noted.
Edward Porter Alexander, Fighting for the Confederacy: The Personal Recollections of General Edward Porter Alexander Gary Gallagher, ed. (Chapel Hill, NC: 1989), p. 245.
Henry Hunt to W. T. Sherman, February, 1882, The BacheldTMer Papers: Gettysburg in their Own Words David L. and Aubrey J. Ladd, eds. (Dayton: 1994-1995), p. 84. Hereafter cited as BP.
Samuel Wilkeson, "A Tragedy at Gettysburg;' Confederate Veteran, 1913, p. 387.
Lee to Hood, May 21, 1863, in Richard Rollins, ed., Pickett's Charge: Eyewitness Accounts (Redondo Beach, Ca: 1994), p. 4.
See Jennings Cropper Wise, The Long Arm of Lee (Lincoln, NE: 1991),and L. Van Loan Naisawald, Grape and Canister: The Story of the Field Artillery of the Army of the Potomac, 1861-1865 (Washington: 1960).
Report of Gen. Robert E. Lee, January, 1863, OR, 321. Lafayette McLaws cited this passage in one of his accounts of the charge. He concluded that Lee meant that "if he had known that our artillery ammunition was so exhausted as to be unable to reply at the critical moment, that the charge would not have been made:' McLaws, "Gettysburg," Southern Historical Society Papers, (hereafter cited as SHSP), VII(1879), p. 82.
Quoted in E. P. Alexander, Military Memoirs of a Confederate (New York: 1907), 415-33. Alexander wrote several versions of these notes. Minor spelling and punctuation variations appear in several, but no substantial differences in content.
E. P. Alexander to Rev. J. William Jones, March 17, 1877, SHSP, Vol. 4(1877), 97-111. Hereafter cited as Alexander to Jones.
"General James Longstreet's Account of the Campaign and Battle," SHSP, 54-86. Longstreet remembered these notes in his autobiography. "...a note to Alexander directed that, Pickett should not be called until the artillery practice indicated fair opportunity." James Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox: Memoirs of the Civil War in America (Philadelphia, 1896), pp. 385-95.
Armistead Long, Memoirs of Robert E. Lee (London: 1886), p. 286-94.
If we use dramatic theater as a metaphor, Lee and Longstreet were the headliners, their subordinate officers the supporting actors. The third ring were bit players, or even extras. Like a play, the meeting depended on the performance of all involved.
Alexander, Fighting for the Confederacy, 244. In the 1880s Alexander wrote an essay for Century magazine, which was later published and widely read in Battle and Leaders of the Civil War as "The Great Charge and Artillery Fighting at Gettysburg," Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, Robert Underwood Johnson and Clarence Clough Buel, Eds., (New York: The Century Magazine, 1888), Vol. III. In this narrative he stated that after securing his guns on July 2nd he rode to Longstreet's headquarters and "I then found General Longstreet, learned what I could of the fortunes of the day another parts of the field, and get orders for the morning. They were, in brief, that our present position was they be held and the attack renewed as soon as Pickett arrived, and he was expected early." See also Alexander to Jones.
Report of Maj. B. F. Eshleman, Washington Artillery, August 11, 1863, OR, 435.
Arthur James Lyon Fremantle, Three Months in the Southern States (New York: N.p., 1864) puts Lee and Longstreet together as the Bliss barn burned.
A more detailed account of the meetings will be given in a forthcoming article.
W. Gart Johnson, "Reminiscences of Lee and of Gettysburg," Confederate Veteran, 19 (August, 1893), p. 246.
William Miller Owen, "Recollections of the Third Day at Gettysburg," The United Service, August, 1885, p. 148.
Ranges of the various weapons: A. Rifled guns: 10 pdr. Parrott Rifle, 2,400 yds; 20 pdr. Parrot Rifle, 3,000 yds; 3-inch Ordnance Rifle, 2,100 yds; B. Smoothbored guns: 12 pdr. Howitzer, 1,800 yds; 12 pdr Napoleon, 1,800 yds.
All measurements made by Global Positioning Satellite on July 1, 1998. These distances are given as a means of indicating the problem and do not imply that the planners knew the exact distances.
E.P. Alexander, "Confederate Artillery Service," SHSP, Vol. 11, pp. 98-113.
Robert E. Lee to Hon. Secretary of War, December 5, 1862, OR, Series 1, Vol. 21, pp. 1046-047. See also Lee to Gorgas, December 5, 1862, Ibid., 1048.
An analysis of the comparative strengths and weaknesses will be given in the forthcoming article on the failure of the artillery in Pickett's Charge.
William H. French, William F. Barry and Henry J. Hunt, Instruction for Field Artillery. (New York: 1860).
Alexander, Fighting, 245. The similarities between the two artillery organizations were legion. R. Snowden Andrews' Confederate instruction book, Mounted Artillery Drill (Charleston: 1863), was nearly a word-for-word copy of the French-Barry-Hunt book.
Capt. Hugh R. Garden to Lloyd Collis, July 18, 1901, in Hugh J. Merick Reid, "Garden's Battery: Recollections of Gettysburg, July 2 and 3, 1863," Sumter Herald, August 29, 1902.
Report of Lieut. C. W. Motes, Troup (Georgia) Artillery, July 31, 1863, OR, 384.
Report of Capt. E. B. Brunson, commanding Reserve Artillery Battalion [3rd C], July 31, 1863, OR, 678.
Report of Lieut. Col. Thomas H. Carter, August 5, 1863, OR, 603. See also Report of Col. J. Thompson Brown, August 13, 1863, OR, 456.
William S. White, A Diary of the War, or What I Saw of It, Contributions to a History of the Richmond Howitzer Battalion, Pamphlet No.2 (Richmond: 1883), p. 207. See also Report of Capt. Willis J. Dance, First Virginia Artillery, commanding Battalion Reserve Artillery, OR, 604.
David Shultz, "Double Canister at Ten Yards"; The Federal Artillery and the Repulse of Pickett's Charge, (Redondo Beach, CA: 1995).
Report of Lieut. Col. William Nelson, commanding battalion Artillery Reserve, August 4, 1863, OR, 605.
For a summary see Jay Jorgenson, "Edward Porter Alexander, Confederate Cannoneer at Gettysburg," Gettysburg Magazine 17 (July, 1997), 41-53, and Thomas L. Elmore, "The Great Cannonade: A Confederate Perspective," Ibid. 19 (1998), pp.100-111.
See "A Combined and Concentrated Fire," North & South, vol. 2;#3, March, 1999.
Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox, 385-95; Pendleton's Report, 352.
Alexander, Fighting for the Confederacy, 258. In this same essay (245-46) he summarized his thoughts on this question just a little differently: "I had not the ammunition to make it a long business. It must be done inside of an hour if ever."
For the action led by Alexander on July 2nd, see Jorgensen, "Alexander." For Jackson in Mexico, see James I. Robertson, Stonewall Jackson: The Man, The Soldier, The Legend (New York: 1997).
James Longstreet, "Lee in Pennsylvania," Philadelphia Weekly Times, Saturday, November 3, 1877, reprinted in SHSP, V (1878), pp. 54-86.
Alexander, Fighting, 245-246. See also Alexander to Bachelder, May 3, 1876, BP, 487-88.
Lee to Davis, July31, 1863, in Rollins, ed., Pickett's Charge: Eyewitness
Accounts, 325;
This article was taken from: Rollins, Richard. “Lee's Artillery Prepares for Picket's Charge.” (North & South, Volume 2, Number 7, September 1999), 41-55. It is used with permission.